Category: 1780

The third important attempt to invade the island was made during this winter which is known as the hard winter of 1779-80. The American forces were quartered in New Jersey for the winter, but poorly clothed, provisioned and armed. General Washington, in his quarters at Morristown, planned this expedition, and left its direction to General Stirling. From their peculiar exposure and sufferings at the moment, the commander-in-chief, perhaps, suggested this attack, to divert the minds of his discontented men from their numerous and fearful forebodings.

Head Qrs Morristown 13th Jan. 1780.

My Lord,

Herewith Inclosed are your Lordships discretionary Instructions—In addition to what you read in the morning, & in consequence of Genl Irvines information respecting the state of the Ice between York, long, & Staten Islands I have inserted a clause by which you will see that if things continue in the condition he represents I would have your Lordship turn your thoughts to the practicability of compelling a surrender of the enemy if they should even resort to their Forts.

I am sorry Colo. Hazen made that March in one day, which was intended for two—To counteract this wd it not be well for Genl Irvines detachment to assume an appearance of returning to Camp?

The Men which will reinforce you in Sleds tomorrow, had better be met at Springfield by your Orders, & a careful person to conduct them at once to the place of rendezvous. the Detachment will consist of abt 400 Men & may join Genl Irvines brigade if you have nothing better in view for them.

You know I presume that 40,000 Cartridges have been sent to Genl Irvine for the use of the Troops on the Expedition.

If Colo. Stewarts Detachment should be ready earlier than I expect tomorrow I will direct him to Halt at quibbletown (under pretence of takg in forage there) till a proper hour arrives for him to proceed.6 I mention this that you may know how to meet him with orders in case you have not seen him since yesterday. & fixed your plan with him—In haste I am Yr Lordships most obt Servt

[George Washington]

The American army was then encamped on the hills back of Morristown, the encampment extending several miles into the country. Their canvas tents afforded but a miserable security from the rain, sleet and snow. On the 3d of January came one of the most tremendous snow storms ever remembered. Some of their sheltering hovels and tents were blown down or torn to pieces, and the soldiers became like sheep under the snow, which fell to a depth of from four to six feet. So obstructed were the roads as to prevent the usual receipt of supplies, and for ten days each man had but two pounds of meat and some even were entirely destitute. But why continue the details of the condition of the American army during that hard winter? They are matters of general history. We have given enough to show that it was under the most disheartening circumstances that the plan of invading Staten Island was conceived and set in operation.

In a letter from General Stirling to George Washington, Lord Stirling explains his doubt for a successful plan of attack:

13 January 1780
from Genl Irvines quarters [Crane’s Mill, N.J.]

Sir,

After a full consultation with General Irvine Col. Hazen and Colonel Stewart, and hearing the result of their intelligence and observations—I am of opinion that an attempt to surprise the enemy on Staten Island would have very little probability of success. They are as much upon their guard as they can be—They have patroles at every accessible place; and for this purpose make use of all the Militia as well as their own horse and foot. The difficulties too of getting upon the Island appear to be greater than was imagined; and the roads will no doubt be rendered very bad by the drifting of the snow as the wind has been pretty high to day. Col. Stewart will give your Excellency a detail of particulars by which you will be the better able to judge whether it will be eligible to continue the original plan to change it for another or defer the execution to a more favourable opportunity—The roads a few days hence may be more practicable and the enemy fatigued by their continual guards and patroles may relax in their vigilance.

It has been suggested that relinquishng the idea of a surprise a descent may be made upon the Island in hopes of bringing the enemy to a surrender, as it is said they are very short of provisions and have no covering in their works—But our intelligence is not so explicite on these heads as might be wished. It is a question whether their huts are not near enough to their works to be effectually under their protection; and on this plan we must expect that our own troops will suffer greatly from the severity of the weather which is at this time excessive.

If any thing is attempted under our present information, I should think our whole force ought to be collected at one point and that the detachments now preparing ought to join the others here.

I shall make every preparation with the troops here and shall be ready to do whatever Your Excellency shall direct—I request the favour of hearing from you as early as possible tomorrow.

My opinion is that if any thing is done it must be by force and in open daylight. Very respectfully Yr obt

stirling,

General Stirling was dispatched with a body of the [2,500] troops to attack the outposts of the enemy on Staten Island. They proceeded in [100] sleighs, and crossing the river on the ice at Elizabethtown point, took up their line of march toward the present site of Port Richmond. The bridge of ice was sufficient to allow the passage of any force across the kills, and it was supposed that the same obstruction would prevent the movement of reinforcements to the enemy by means of their shipping in the bay. The detachment under Stirling numbered about two thousand five hundred men.

When a little east of Port Richmond the column divided, part marching onward toward New Brighton, where the British post had been erected on the hills, and the other wing proceeding up Mill lane, the present Columbia street of West New Brighton, and approached the mill which stood at the head of the pond. The night of the 14th, on which they made this long passage from camp to the designed scene of action was a starry night, bright and clear, but so intensely cold that about one third of the men were more or less wounded by the biting frost. The intent was to surprise Skinner’s brigade of new recruits, but it was soon discovered that their designs had been anticipated by the enemy, information having reached them through the kind offices of their tory friends. A surprise was now out of the question, and as the works of the enemy were well situated and apparently strong, and the means of receiving reinforcements from New York not obstructed as had been expected, it was deemed unadvisable to make an assault.

The troops spent the day of the 15th of January and the following night on the island, in snow waist deep, protecting themselves as well as they could from the inclement weather by making huge fires of the cordwood which they found piled up where they halted. The British during the day sent a boat to New York, which returned at evening with reinforcements. On the morning of the 16th Stirling withdrew his detachment to Elizabethtown. The official report of Stirling concludes with the following statements:

“The retreat was effected in good order, and with very little loss. A party of the enemy’s horse charged our rear guard under Major Edwards, but was immediately repulsed. The major had three men killed. Some few of the men were frost bitten, and though we took all the pains in our power to have all those unable to march transported in sleighs, yet I imagine a very few may have been left behind.”

Immediately after crossing, a party was detached under Lieutenant-Colonel Willett, to Decker’s house. The corps there had been alarmed and barely made its escape. The house as a garrison place, and 8 or 9 small vessels were burned. A considerable quantity of blankets and other stores were found.”

While the troops were upon the island, a number of persons from this side [Elizabethtown] took advantage of the occasion to pass upon the island, and plunder the people there in the most shameful and merciless manner. Many of them were stopped on their return, and their booty taken from them. In addition to which, I have sent an order for publication, requiring those who had eluded the search to restore the articles in their possession, and exhorting the good people at large, to assist in detecting them. All the soldiery on recrossing the ice, were searched, and the little plunder they had taken from them, and their names noted, that they may be brought to punishment. The articles recovered are, and will be deposited with the Revd. Mr. Caldwell, who is exerting himself in the affair, to be returned to the owners. I am happy to inform your Excellency, that a very inconsiderable part indeed, of the troops, dishonored themselves, by participating in these enormities.”

Additional light is thrown upon the affair by the following extract from a letter from an officer on board the British brig “Hawk,” lying off Staten Island at the time.

“On the 15th inst. at Day break, the Alarm was given, that the Rebels were on Staten Island, an Express was sent on board from Gen. [Thomas] Sterling [no relation to William Alexander] to prepare for Action; we immediately got a Spring on our Cable and cleared Ship, the Rebels appeared on the Hill over the Ferry, and brought a Field Piece to bear upon us, which we perceiving, fired our bow Gun twice at them, the second shot roused them from a Meal they were making of broiled Beef Stakes; their Fire from the Field Piece was well directed, but the Shot fell short of us some Yards. A large Party of Rebels came down to burn the Houses and Forage, we fired on them, shot one Man’s Arm off; he bled to death and now lays in the snow; our Firing made them retreat as fast as possible up the Hill to their main Body (which by the Information of two Prisoners and a Deserter that we had on board, consisted of 4,000 Foot, 200 Horse, 6 Brass Field Pieces 6 Pounders, and a Number of Artillery Men) Gen. Skinner sent a Letter on board, thanking us for the Service we did. ‘Tis certain that the ‘Hawk’ prevented the Forage, the Tavern, and all the Houses in that Neighborhood from being burnt. A Number of Men, Women and Children came on board for Refuge with their Goods and Effects.”

Another British account contains so much that will be read with interest that it is presented here. Proper allowances must be made for the partisan coloring in these statements of interested persons at the time: “On Friday Night the 14th inst. a large Detachment from the Rebel Army, consisting, it is supposed, of between 3 and 4000 Men, with 6 Pieces of Cannon, and 2 Howitzers, moved suddenly from the neighborhood of Morristown, and being (as it is reported) transported in Sleighs over the Ice, reached Staten-Island before Day break in the Morning of the 15th, bending their March towards Decker’s-Ferry. Colonel [von]Buskirk commanding the 4th Battalion of Brigadier-General Skinner’s Brigade posted there, having received Intelligence of their Approach, judged it proper to retire towards Ryerson’s Ferry, not being in Force sufficient to oppose so considerable a corps. The Rebels pursued their March, and before Noon took Post upon the Heights, near the Redoubts, constructed at the North End of the Island: from their Position, cutting off the Communication between the Corps hutted there, and the Troops at Richmond[town] and the Flag Staff [present-day Fort Wadsworth]: they remained in this Situation till early in the Morning of the 16th, when they were observed retiring from Staten Island, without attempting any Thing; they burnt Decker’s House, and a very few small Vessels frozen in by the Ice at that Place. A small Detachment which harassed their Rear, made a few Prisoners; and several Deserters came to the different Posts during their Stay on the Island.

“They committed many Excesses, in plundering and distressing the Inhabitants. “Sixteen Prisoners have been already sent to New York; and it is imagined there are others not yet arrived from Staten Island.” It may be noted in passing that the ice soon after became more solid, and there was a bridge across the bay from the island to New York, over which loaded sleighs and other heavy burdens were drawn. A paper of February 7 has the item that eighty six loaded sleighs passed over on the ice the day before. The most intense frost, accompanied by great falls of snow began about the middle of December, and shut up navigation to the port of New York from the sea for many weeks. The severity of the weather increased to such an extent that about the middle of January all communication with New York city by water was cut off, and new means opened by the ice. The passage of the North river from the city was about the 19th of January practicable for the heaviest cannon, a circumstance previously unknown in the memory of man. Soon after provisions were transported in sleighs, and detachments of cavalry marched from New York to Staten Island upon the ice. The East river was also blocked up for many days. In this state of their communications the British on New York island were apprehensive of an attack from the army of Washington, and set on foot a project for putting the loyal expressions of the inhabitants to a test by raising about forty companies of troops among them. This gave them good courage and they actually began to hope that the Americans would make an attack, so well prepared did they feel to resist it. It was not until the 20th of February that the frost abated so as to allow the waters surrounding New York to become navigable.

General Stirling summed up the results of the attack and the subsequent retreat back into New Jersey:

Eliz. Town [N.J.] Jany 16. 1780

Sir,

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that early on yesterday morning the corps under my command crossed the sound at DeHarts point and proceeded towards the Watering place. The enemy having received previous intellegence of our movements a surprise was out of the question; and as their works were well situated and appeared otherwise strong an assault was deemed unadviseable, as it would probably have cost us more than we could have gained by success—We found too contrary to our expectation that the communication between the Island and New York was open.  Immediately on our arrival in front of the enemy’s works, they sent off a boat to the city; and in the evening several vessels came down from thence to the Island. As from this circumstance there was no hope of reducing them for want of provision or fuel and a reinforcement might have rendered our continuance dangerous we determined to march off this morning—The retreat was effected in good order and with very little loss. A party of the enemy’s horse charged our rear guard under Major Edwards, but was immediately repulsed. The Major had three men killed, killed one of the light horsemen and took his horse—some of the men were frost-bitten, and though we took all the pains in our power to have all those unable to march transported in slays, yet I imagine a very few may have been Left behind. We took a few prisoners and had a few deserters from the enemy.

Immediately after crossing a party was detached under Lt Colonel Willet to Deckers house. The corps there had been alarmed and barely made its escape—The house (as a garrison place) and eight or nine small vessels near it were burnt.  A considerable quantity of blankets, and other stores were found.

While the troops were upon the Island a number of persons from this side took advantage of the occasion to pass upon the Island and plunder the people there in the most shameful and merciless manner. Many of them were stopped on their return & their booty taken from them; in addition to which I have sent an order for publication requiring those who had eluded the search to restore the articles in their possession and exhorting the good people at large to assist in detecting them. All the soldiery, on recrossing the ice were searched, and the little plunder they had taken from them; and their names noted, that they may be brought to punishment. The articles recovered are and will be deposited with The Reverend Mr Caldwell (who is exerting himself in the affair) to be returned to the owners.  I am happy to inform your Excellency that a very inconsiderable part indeed of the troops dishonored themselves by participating in these enormities.

The officers and men in general showed a good disposition and I only regret there was no opportunity of turning it to advantage. I have the honor to be yr Excellency’s Most Obedt & hume se⟨rt⟩

Stirling,

______________________
SOURCES: History of Richmond County (Staten Island), New York from its discovery to the present time, Richard M. Bayles (New York: L.E. Preston & Co. 1887).

Morris’s memorial history of Staten Island, New York, Ira K. Morris (New York: Memorial Publishing Co. 1898)

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-24-02-0133

1. For Stirling’s orders for this raid, see GW to Stirling, 13 Jan. (first letter), source note.

2. As early as 13 Jan., it was known in New York City that the Continental army was planning to attack Staten Island. New York printer Hugh Gaine wrote in his journal entry for 13 Jan.: “Whispers that the Rebels meditate an Attack in Staten Island” (Ford, Journals of Hugh Gaine, 2:75). British brigadier general Thomas Stirling, commanding on Staten Island, was alerted by five deserters from Major General Stirling’s command (see Baurmeister, Revolution in America, 338).

3. Stirling was mistaken in his belief that reinforcements could reach Staten Island from New York City; futile British efforts to cross troops to the island apparently deceived him into thinking they could make the crossing. In his report to Gen. Henry Clinton for 15 and 16 Jan., Lt. Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen, temporary commander of the royal forces in the New York City area, stated: “Every attempt was made to send Reinforcements from New York, upon the Evening of the 15th and before day break in the morning of the 16th but it was found impracticable; the Ice having totally obstructed the Navigation, and a similar exertion from Dennys’s Ferry [Long Island, N.Y.], was attended with little better success” (Knyphausen’s report, 1 Jan.–24 Feb. 1780, MiU-C: Clinton Papers). Lt. Col. John Graves Simcoe, whose Queen’s Rangers were stationed on the island, later wrote that “General Kniphausen, on the first signal of Staten Island being attacked, embarked troops to support it. The enemy in the dark of the evening saw these vessels, (which, whether the passage could be effected or not, were wisely directed to be kept plying off and on,) but they did not wait to see if they could reach the island, which in fact the drifting ice prevented, but immediately determining to retreat, they effected it the next morning” (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, 128).

4. This sentence does not appear on the copy sent to Huntington. GW corrected this omission in a brief note sent the same day (see the source note to GW to Huntington, 18 Jan. [second letter]). Maj. Carl Leopold Baurmeister, aide-de-camp to Knyphausen, reported that the Americans left “twenty stragglers and as many deserters” behind on the island (Baurmeister, Revolution in America, 338). Simcoe claimed that the Americans lost “many men by desertion, and many British soldiers, who had enlisted with them to free themselves from imprisonment, embraced the opportunity of being in a country they were acquainted with, to return to their old companions. The Queen’s Rangers obtained a great many recruits” (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, 128).

5. Loyalist and militia cavalry officer Isaac Decker later filed a memorial with the British government stating that Stirling’s soldiers had burned the rigging of his sloop, plundered his house, stripped his wife of her clothes, taken all his crops, and burned his fences (Coldham, American Loyalist Claims, 120).

6. Stirling’s order, signed by his aide-de-camp William Barber and dated this date at Elizabeth, N.J., reads: “By an order of the 14th instant, all officers, soldiers, militia men, and followers of the army, were positively prohibited from plundering or insulting the inhabitants of Staten-Island; notwithstanding which many of the inhabitants of this State took the advantage of the opportunity, while the army kept the enemy within their works, and acted in open violation thereof; Major General Lord Stirling therefore positively requires, that all persons possessed of any articles of plunder, taken on the Island, do immediately deliver the same to Doctor Caldwell, at Springfield, to the end that they may be returned to the proper owners, otherwise they will be proceeded against with military severity.—The very few of the soldiery who were guilty of the same misconduct have been already compelled to restore what they had taken, and will be most severely punished. All the good people of this state who know any persons within the above description, are desired to give immediate information thereof.

“The Major General thanks the officers and men for the good disposition shewn in this excursion; particularly for the good order so conspicuous on retiring from the Island; he is only sorry circumstances did not permit him to avail himself more effectually of their services” (New-Jersey Journal [Chatham], 18 Jan.). For James Caldwell’s efforts to have this plunder returned, see Caldwell to GW, 19 Jan.; see also GW to Caldwell, 21 Jan., and GW to Moses Hazen, 21 Jan. (second letter).

7. Hamilton wrote this paragraph after the closing and Stirling’s signature and marked it for inclusion at this point.

8. On 15 Jan., Brig. Gen. Thomas Stirling wrote to Knyphausen with his account of his opposition to the American expedition. Brigadier Stirling explained that “Being informed at half an hour after seven in the morning by Lieut.-Colonel Buskirk that the enemy had crossed upon the ice from Elizabeth Town with artillery and that he had abandoned Deckers House in consequence of orders I had previously given him if they came with cannon, it not being tenable, and that he was retiring slowly towards the redoubts, I immediately ordered 300 men with 2 three-pounders to occupy the heights on our right in front of the redoubts, and repaired myself there to reconnoitre the enemy, ordering at same time 20 light dragoons to observe their motions. On their approach the rebels fired three shot from two field-pieces planted behind Deckers House. I observed them advancing in two columns, one towards the Clove by Housmans, the other by Deckers near Freshwater Pond, the two columns coming nearly at same time on each side of the pond and took possession of the woody heights in front of the centre and left-had redoubts and extending all along them to near the mouth of the Clove, while another body of them, about 600 men with 2 field-pieces, was sent to mask the troops at the flagstaff and the road to Richmond, and a body of 200 formed in front upon our right. Finding my numbers not sufficient to meet them on the field, I was forced to content myself with occupying the grounds near to and in front of the redoubts and making the best disposition I could to receive them should they offer to attack us. An armed brig which lay off the watering place was of essential service to us in covering our left flank and protecting our hay and wood magazines. About 12 o’clock the rebels began to light fires and continued in that position the whole evening and night without any alteration or attempt upon any of our advanced parties. A little after daybreak I was informed a column of the enemy was advancing on our right; upon viewing them I found it consisted of about 150 men, who upon the approach of a small party I carried with me began to retire, and in half an hour after the enemy were discovered going off by Deckers Ferry. A party of 200 men were ordered immediately to follow them and 20 light dragoons. Lieutenant Stewart of the provincial light horse who commanded them and Cornet Tucker of the 17th [Light Dragoons] made a gallant charge on their rear and took a serjeant and four men prisoners, but our foot not being able to keep pace with them nothing more could be done, the rebels having broke up the bridge at Deckers Mills so soon as they crossed, and by ten this morning were all off the island. They burnt Deckers House and five woodboats that lay on the ice. We have taken a serjeant and sixteen men prisoners; by them I learn great numbers of the rebels were frostbit and sent off during the night in sleighs” (Davies, Documents of the American Revolution, 18:34–35).

Simcoe, who believed that the time for the attack had been “well chosen” by the American generals, later wrote that Major General Stirling’s march to the Watering Place “cut off General [Thomas] Stirling’s communication with the Volunteers of Ireland [stationed at the Flagstaff] and the Queen’s Rangers [at Richmond]. Lt. Col. Simcoe occupied the high grounds near Richmond with small parties of cavalry, and the infantry were sedulously employed in what might strengthen that post. … all the cattle in the neighbourhood were brought into the precincts of the garrison, as were the sledges, harness and horses, and the most cheerful and determined appearance of resolution ran through the whole corps. About midday, many deserters came in from the rebel army; by them a perfect knowledge of the enemy’s force was gained.” Simcoe intended to launch an attack on Major General Stirling’s rear but was unable to prevail upon the Staten Island Loyalist militia to take the place of the Rangers in the Richmond redoubts. Upon learning of the retreat of Major General Stirling’s battalions, Simcoe “immediately pursued them with the flank companies and Huzzars; and was overtaken by an order from General [Thomas] Stirling to effect the same purpose; but the enemy had passed to the Jersey shore before he could come up with them. While the troops in the enemy’s front, on their arrival at the heights opposite to the British redoubts [at the Watering Place], halted for the rear to close up, they were permitted to make fires, which increased the power of the frost, and rendered them totally unable to proceed, and the severity of the night affecting the whole of them, many lost their limbs, and several their lives.” Simcoe asserted that the “vast mounds of snow drifted before the redoubts” deterred Major General Stirling from attacking at the Watering Place (Simcoe, Operations of the Queen’s Rangers, 121–28; see also Baurmeister, Revolution in America, 338).

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